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I know the Wall Street crowd can’t wait to sink their teeth into a
new trillion-dollar trading market in which hedge funds and
investment banks would trade and speculate on carbon credits and
securities. In no time they’ll create derivatives, swaps and more in
that new market. In fact, most of the investment banks have already
created carbon trading departments. They are ready to go. I’m
not.
Senator Byron Dorgan (D-North Dakota)1
People are going to be cutting up carbon futures, and we’ll be in
trouble. . . . You can’t stay ahead of the next tool they’re going to
create. . . . The derivatives market has done so much damage to our
economy and is nothing more than a very-high-stakes casino—
except that casinos have to abide by regulations.
Senator Maria Cantwell (D-Washington)2
You’re essentially setting up a brand-new currency here. . . . The
American public is more than just a little suspicious about what
goes on in the trading world. It’s not clear and not transparent,
and nothing I’ve seen allows it to be so. There’s a deep suspicion
about setting up such a regime.
Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska)3

1. Byron Dorgan, Reduce Our CO2, Yes . . . But Cap-and-Trade, No, BISMARK TRIB., July 19,
2009, http://www.bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/mailbag/article_c337fb0c-434a-51a4-ae35-d5
7bb0357997.html.
2. Lisa Kassenaar, Carbon Capitalists Warming to Climate Market Using Derivatives,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aXRBOxU5KT5M (quoting Senator Maria Cantwell, D-Washington).
3. Joel Kirkland, Senators Call for Financial Reform Before Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/05/05climatewire-senators-call-for-financialreform-before-ca-93661.html (quoting Senator Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska).
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The system can be gamed; that’s why financial types like me like
it—because there are financial opportunities.
George Soros4
I. INTRODUCTION
There are many reasons that comprehensive United States climate
change legislation has moved more slowly than anticipated just a few years
ago.5 But surely the most important has to be the impact and aftermath of
the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The economic effects of the
crisis have reverberated in the political sphere, where many analysts suggest
that given the weak job and economic situation, now is not the time to
introduce the “expense” of climate change legislation.6 Related to this is the
choice that was made to pursue major health care reform, whose political
future may also be tied to the weak economy.7 The combination of these
events has been a potent drag on movement in climate change, especially in
the U.S. Senate. As stated by Senator Byron Dorgan, D-North Dakota:
My own sense is that in the aftermath of a very, very heavy lift on
health care, I think it is unlikely that the Senate will turn next to the
very complicated and very controversial subject of cap-and-trade,8
climate change kind of legislation. . . . I think it is more compelling
to turn to an energy bill that is bi-partisan.9

4. Katherine Burton & Jim Efstathiou, Jr., Soros to Invest $1 Billion in Clean Energy, Form
Advisory Group, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2009, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aehNEmSWfjiQ (quoting George Soros).
5. Victor B. Flatt, Taking the Legislative Temperature: Which Federal Climate Change
Legislative Proposal Is “Best”?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 123, 123 (2007) (“The United
States will almost certainly enact federal legislation designed to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases within the next two years.”).
6. Darren Samuelsohn, Economic Crisis Rattles Cap-and-Trade Debate, EARTH NEWS (Sept.
29, 2008), http://www.earthportal.org/news/?p=1744.
7. Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.
But see Stephanie Cutter,
Repealing the Affordable Care Act Will Hurt the Economy, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011, 1:36
PM), http://m.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/01/07/repealing-affordable-care-act-will-hurt-economy.
8. See Cap and Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/
timestopics/subjects/g/greenhouse_gas_emissions/cap_and_trade/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier
(explaining the “cap-and-trade” regulatory system).
9. Tom Doggett, Senate Not Seen Passing Climate Bill in 2010, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 4:22
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60I3NA20100119.
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But the impact of the economic crisis on comprehensive climate change
legislation is not just because of the perceived costs of such measures in a
weakened economy, but also the fear that a comprehensive cap-and-trade
carbon market could produce exotic financial instruments that would lead to
a similar crisis in the future. As evidenced by some of the quotes above, this
concern was particularly acute in the United States Senate, where the ability
to garner the sixty votes necessary to move on climate change legislation
may be derailed by just a few senators suspicious of an emerging U.S.
“carbon” market.
Even if a comprehensive U.S. climate bill is not forthcoming,
California’s emerging economy-wide climate regulation, the Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32), despite a recent setback,10 is likely
to depend on a comprehensive cap-and-trade scheme.11 This system, if
linked with other carbon trading systems in North America as anticipated,
will cover over one-third of the North American economy.12 Moreover, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began regulating greenhouse gases
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in January 2010,13 and though EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson has said that the EPA has no plans to create a
cap-and-trade system to deal with greenhouse gases, the possibility of the
EPA using such a system remains.14 Several analysts have found legal
authority for such a system.15 The newly elected Republican majority in the

10. A California Superior Court Judge recently suspended the implementation of AB 32’s capand-trade provisions, holding that the California Air Resources Board failed to adequately consider
other options. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-509562, Order Granting
in Part Petition For Writ of Mandate, filed Mar. 18, 2011, available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/
SiteCollectionDocuments/Environmental%20Law/Court%27s%20Final%20Order%203%2017%201
1.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2011); see also Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2010) [hereinafter AB 32].
11. See Colin Sullivan, Calif. Regulators Scramble in Wake of Court Ruling on Climate Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/24/24greenwire-califregulators-scramble-in-wake-of-court-rul-93103.html?pagewanted=all; see also Cap-and-Trade
Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
12. Simon Lomax, Cap-and-Trade Market for North America Weighed by States After Obama
Fails, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2010, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-30/capand-trade-market-for-north-america-weighed-by-states-after-obama-fails.html; see also Nathanial
Gronewald, Traders and Experts Say Regional Cap-and-Trade Systems will Proliferate,
CLIMATEWIRE (June 16, 2011), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Climatewire_June_16.pdf.
13. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (effective Jan. 14, 2010).
14. Simon Lomax, EPA Studying Own Carbon Trading System, Official Says (Update2),
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2010, 5:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=ammjHfzRpc9I.
15. See generally Hannah Chang, Cap-and-Trade Under the Clean Air Act?: Rethinking Section
115 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Climate Change Law, Working Paper, Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=155078
(describing the legality of a potential EPA attempt to institute a cap-and-trade program for
Greenhouse Gases under Section 115 of the CAA); see also Jonas Monast et al., Avoiding the
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House of Representatives may attempt to limit the EPA’s authority to
regulate greenhouse gases under the CAA,16 but given the Democratic
majority in the Senate and a likely presidential veto, these attempts would
likely amount to nothing more than grandstanding.
Due to the EPA’s possible implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme,
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the Northeast United States, and
California’s coming implementation, cap-and-trade will in all likelihood be a
fixture of greenhouse gas regulation in the United States for the foreseeable
future. Any programs instituted by the EPA, California, and other North
American entities will likely be watched closely for their effect on the
market. Their successes and failures, along with their perceived risks, could
play a large role in determining whether or not the United States will ever
adopt mandatory nationwide carbon emissions limitations through a
comprehensive climate change bill. Given the importance of the role that
markets might play in large domestic regional systems or a CAA regulatory
environment, the fear of a carbon market as a financial Trojan horse must be
carefully analyzed to determine what risks might lurk in a carbon market in
the large United States market.
Analyzing the issues at this stage serves two important goals. If
comprehensive climate change legislation is eventually passed, it is
important that the legislation be tailored to address those risks; and even if
Congress fails to pass a comprehensive bill, it could still intervene in a
piecemeal fashion to insure that an EPA imposed cap-and-trade scheme does
not pose undue risks to the financial markets. Moreover, if emerging
systems do not work properly or fail outright, they could delay or suspend
greenhouse gas regulation on a domestic level, and possibly limit any
potential worldwide agreement on greenhouse gas reductions.
While carbon markets in this country do create a certain amount of
market risk, this Article posits that risk can be lessened by careful language
in a cap-and-trade bill or an agency regulation, particularly language
governing greenhouse gas offsets—which, as discussed in Parts III and IV,17
could create the most significant risk in the financial markets. However, this
Article is not designed to lobby for a cap-and-trade system; it is designed to

Glorious Mess: A Sensible Approach to Climate Change and the Clean Air Act (Duke Univ.
Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper, Oct. 2010), available at
http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/avoiding-the-glorious-mess.
16. See Tennille Tracy, Upton Looks to Block Greenhouse Gas Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2,
2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118994154302516.html.
17. See infra notes 79–101 and accompanying text.
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produce information necessary to create the most efficient way of
controlling greenhouse gases.
In addition to the fear of market disruptions and profiteering, there is an
equal or perhaps more important concern that a greenhouse gas cap-andtrade system will fail to control the environmental impacts as advertised
precisely because of market control failures. Reductions could certainly be
illusory due to monitoring difficulties or outright fraud.18 This is a serious
concern and any careful cap-and-trade system must address both concerns
about the environmental efficacy of the system as well as the risks for
market problems. In fact, these issues are related. Any system to control
greenhouse gases should both do what it is designed to do—reduce
greenhouse gases in the amount expected—and do it efficiently. A cap-andtrade system for its own sake, while perhaps welcome by commodity traders,
would be environmentally counterproductive if there were a serious risk of
failing to accomplish environmental goals. Indeed, Michelle Chan,
President of Friends of the Earth has propagated a list entitled “Ten Ways to
Game the Carbon Market,” which is designed to discourage Congress from
passing cap-and-trade legislation, or at least cap-and-trade legislation that
contains offsets.19 Thus, any discussion of the probabilities and fears of
market problems must also bear in mind the risk of environmental failure.
Nevertheless, due to the fact that political forces seem fearful of economic
impacts, this Article approaches cap-and-trade from the angle of minimizing
both environmental and financial failures.
Part I of this Article begins by discussing the history of the push for
comprehensive climate legislation with particular emphasis on the
preference for a cap-and-trade system. Part II then briefly reviews the role
that toxic assets played in the financial crisis, before analyzing the potential
risks of such toxic assets infecting a greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system,
particularly in the offset system. Part III discusses the possibility of offset
failure, which, as discussed in Part II, could give rise to market disruptions
along two distinct axes: market failure and environmental failure. Part IV
proposes legislative and regulatory solutions that could lessen the risk
inherent in these failures or that could cause it to be avoided entirely. Part V
concludes.

18. See Flatt, supra note 5, at 138; Victor Flatt, Tackling the Issue of Fraud in Carbon Trading,
(Feb. 10, 2010, 1:49 PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2010/02/10/tackling-the-issue-of-fraudin-carbon-trading/. There is also the concern that even an effectively functioning greenhouse gas
market will have other negative impacts on society or the environment. See Victor Flatt, KerryLieberman Creates Some Added Certainty on Offsets, CPRBLOG (May 12, 2010),
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=8E818F19-A0D1-39EA-7299E012C45D
6CBE.
19. MICHELLE CHAN, TEN WAYS TO GAME THE CARBON MARKET (May 2010), available at
http://www.probeinternational.org/files/10WaystoGametheCarbonMarkets_Web.pdf.
FUELFIX
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II. BACKGROUND OF CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
A serious push for comprehensive climate change legislation began even
before the election of Barack Obama and increased congressional majorities
for the Democrats in the United States House and Senate.20 The first
comprehensive bill was proposed by Senators John McCain and Joe
Lieberman in 2005.21 Activity at the state and local levels and business
concerns over piecemeal legislation prompted more momentum for a
comprehensive federal response.22
After the Democratic election sweep in November 2008, momentum
increased.23 In June 2009, the House passed comprehensive legislation,
called the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 200924 (ACES), and
the Senate moved a bill proposed by Senators John Kerry and Barbara Boxer
(Kerry-Boxer) out of the Energy and Public Works Committee.25 In 2010,
Senators Kerry, Lieberman, and Graham proposed adjusting the primary
cap-and-trade proposals with incentives for nuclear energy and more
offshore oil drilling,26 while Senators Cantwell and Collins proposed a
redistribution of emission allocation proceeds to the general public (the socalled cap-and-dividend approach).27 The former was derailed by Senate
machinations (including political issues such as parallel immigration reform)

20. Flatt, supra note 5, at 123.
21. Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. (2005).
22. See, e.g., JOEL B. SMITH ET AL., ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A CALL FOR FEDERAL
LEADERSHIP (Pew Center on Global Climate Change ed., Mar. 2010), available at
http://pewclimate.org/docUploads/adaptation-federal-leadership.pdf.
23. ANALYSIS: As Momentum from 2008 Election Fades, Senators Struggle to Salvage Climate
Bill, US LAW WATCH (July 12, 2010), http://www.uslawwatch.com/2010/07/12/environment/
analysis-momentum-2008-election-fades-senators-struggle-salvage-climate-bill.
24. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
25. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). The bill was
also co-sponsored by Senators Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) and Paul Kirk (D-Ma.). See id. For an
analysis of these legislative developments, see Jonas Monast, Climate Change and Financial
Markets: Regulating the Trade Side of Cap and Trade, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10051
(2010), available at http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CBQQFjAA&url=
http%3A%2F%2Fnicholasinstitute.duke.edu%2Fclimate%2Fcarbon-market-oversight%2Fclimate-c
hange-and-financial-markets-regulating-the-trade-side-of-cap-and-trade%2Fat_download%2Fpaper
&ei=Ofh7TL__LIHGlQeEsr3sCw&usg=AFQjCNFAW9sRwf6kp4d4zEdTvPHiDAZdbw.
26. American Power Act, Discussion Draft, 111th Cong. (2010), available at
http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/APAbill3.pdf.
27. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, 111th Cong.
(2010).
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and the Deepwater Horizon oil well platform blowout;28 while the latter
failed to gain expected traction.29
The EPA has moved in parallel to regulate greenhouse gases under
provisions of the Clean Air Act, finding that greenhouse gases endanger the
public health and welfare on December 7, 2009.30 Although the EPA, states,
and regions appear ready to move forward with some kind of regulation,
prospects for comprehensive federal legislation seem murky.31
While the private sector seems to be moving forward with the idea that
some kind of regulation is inevitable,32 the slowdown in the Senate has had
consequences. For example, in the lead-up to the Copenhagen Conference
of the Parties in December 2009, the Senate’s inability to pass
comprehensive climate change legislation caused international attitudes
towards the United States to sour, which may have caused the United States
to lose leverage in pushing other nations towards binding greenhouse gas
reduction targets.33 Additionally, Congress’s inaction has led to frustration
in the private sector, as business leaders complain that they must know how
and when climate change legislation will progress before they can move
forward with future plans.34

28. See, e.g., Kerry, Lieberman Willing To Scale Back Energy Bill To Get Republican Support,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 29, 2010, 3:51 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/29/kerrylieberman-willing-t_n_629618.html; see also David O. Williams, Congress Narrowly Passes
CLEAR Act as Salazar Joins GOP Opposition, COLO. INDEP. (July 30, 2010, 6:17 PM),
http://coloradoindependent.com/58594/congress-narrowly-passes-clear-act-as-salazar-joins-gopopposition.
29. See S. 2877: Carbon Limits and Energy for America’s Future Renewal (CLEAR) Act,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-2877 (last visited Oct. 3,
2011). The bill was introduced in December 2009 and has never made it out of committee. See id.
30. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/
endangerment.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2011).
31. See, e.g., Amy Harder, EPA Vote: Momentum Builder?, NATIONALJOURNAL, June 14, 2010,
http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2010/06/epa-vote-momentum-builder.php; see also CAL. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/homepage.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
32. See
Fortune
500s
See
Cost
Savings
From
Carbon
Management,
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Jan. 26, 2011, 10:03 AM), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/
index.cfm/go/news.display/id/21768.
33. See Victor Flatt, Climate Change Confusion in US Infects Lead Up to Copenhagen, FUELFIX
(Nov. 7, 2009, 7:33 PM), http://fuelfix.com/blog/2009/11/07/climate-change-confusion-in-usinfects-lead-up-to-copenhagen/.
34. See Danny Bradbury, Business Leaders Blast Congress for Cap-and-Trade Indecision,
BUSINESSGREEN (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1804808/business-leadersblast-congress-cap-trade-indecision.
Even without comprehensive federal regulation, many
businesses and residents of the United States will see regulation in possible state or regional systems,
as well as likely regulation under the Clean Air Act by the EPA. See supra notes 9–11 and
accompanying text.

626

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 619, 2012]

3/14/2012 2:27 PM

Offsetting Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Aside from the possibility of piecemeal legislation primarily focused on
energy investment and efficiency,35 the only real candidates for
comprehensive federal climate change law remain economy wide cap-andtrade bills.
These cap-and-trade preferences appear to run deep.36
California’s AB 32 does not mandate a cap-and-trade bill, but this is what
has been proposed in rulemaking.37 Additionally, the European Union (EU)
has utilized a cap-and-trade approach, under the auspices of the Kyoto
Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms as its primary greenhouse gas control
vehicle.38 In the summer of 2010, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand
all moved in the direction of a cap-and-trade system.39 The fact that capand-trade systems already exist and have a long history is a powerful
incentive for the United States to adopt one.
The United States itself was the single most important factor in bringing
about the possibility of cap-and-trade for greenhouse gases in the negotiation
of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms, under the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997.40 Europe adopted this
flexible approach under a multi-country system starting in 2005, and has
revisited and expanded it since then.41
In addition to the “first mover” push that existing systems give to capand-trade, economics favors expansion of cap-and-trade rather than
introduction of a new system. Cap-and-trade systems are more efficient and

35. See Steven Mufson, Vanishing Cap and Trade in Obama’s 2012 Budget, WASH. POST, Feb.
14, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/post-carbon/2011/02/vanishing_cap_and_trade_in_
oba.html.
36. Flatt, supra note 5, at 135 (“Interestingly all of the climate change legislative proposals
would be considered market-based control regimes, with Bingaman-Specter, Udall-Petri, LiebermanMcCain, Kerry-Snowe, Waxman, Feinstein-Carper, and Alexander-Lieberman, all envisioning a
cap-and-trade scheme for CO2 . . . .”).
37. Cap-and-Trade Program, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD. (Nov. 13, 2011),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm.
38. The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development
Mechanism and Joint Implementation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter UNFCCC].
39. See Robert Stavins, Opportunities and Ironies: Climate Policy in Tokyo, Seoul, Brussels,
and Washington, AN ECON. VIEW ON THE ENV’T (Mar. 21, 2010), http://www.robertstavinsblog.org/
2010/03/21/opportunities-and-ironies-climate-policy-in-tokyo-seoul-brussels-and-washington/;
China Studying Cap-And-Trade System to Help Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
17, 2010, 8:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-18/china-studies-cap-and-tradesystem-to-spur-reduction-in-carbon-emissions.html.
40. Michael Grubb, The Economics of the Kyoto Protocol, 4 WORLD ECON. 143, 143 (2003),
available at http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/rstaff/grubb/publications/J36.pdf.
41. UNFCCC, supra note 38. Though its terms were set to expire in 2012, it was extended until
2020 under an agreement reached at COP 16 in Durban, South Africa.
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powerful if they become larger, and the EU has called for all Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development countries to become part of
one market.42 In 2007, former Governor Schwarzenegger of California put
forward an executive order requiring California’s eventual cap-and-trade
system to integrate with the EU’s system.43 Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative officials have also expressed interest in integrating with the EU.44
The established infrastructure for cap-and-trade schemes, both capital
and knowledge intensive, has already grown up around the EU system and is
a powerful voice and incentive for expanding and propagating cap-and-trade
systems for greenhouse gas control. The market alternative, coordinating
equivalent tax systems between sovereigns, is more difficult (though not
impossible) than simply allowing a worldwide clearinghouse price to arise in
free trading.45 This is because a system in which individual sovereigns selfimpose a carbon tax could potentially cause problems for international trade,
and any attempt to coordinate such systems could implicate complex issues
under World Trade Organization rules.46 A unified cap-and-trade system, on
the other hand, reaches the optimal market price through the operation of the
market itself.
Additionally, in evaluating a carbon tax versus a cap-and-trade system,
cap-and-trade may offer the advantage of vested interests keeping the system
robust, whereas a tax system is subject to ongoing lobbying by special
interest groups which can weaken and distort the ultimate tax goals by
carving out special market distorting exceptions.47 Moreover, even absent
special interest groups, Professor Deborah Paul proposed that any tax system
will become more complex over time as it tries to better achieve policy goals

42. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REFORMING INTERNATIONAL CARBON MARKET MECHANISMS,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0013/info_sheet_carbon_markets_final_en.pdf (last
visited Dec. 12, 2011).
43. Robin Lancaster, Schwarzenegger Under Fire on Emissions Trading Plans,
ENVIRONMENTAL FINANCE (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.environmental-finance.com/news/view/394.
44. Joseph Kruger & William A. Pizer, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: Prelude to a
National Program?, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/RegionalGreenhouse-Gas-Initiative.aspx; INT’L CARBON ACTION P’SHIP, POLITICAL DECLARATION (Oct. 29,
2007), available at http://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/premier/icap_declaration_oct2007.pdf.
45. TIMOTHY E. DEAL, WTO RULES AND PROCEDURES AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL 10–12 (United States Council for Int’l Bus. ed., Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.uscib.org/docs/wto_and_kyoto_2008.pdf.
46. See id.
47. Adam S. Chodorow, Maaser Kesafim and the Development of Tax Law, 8 FLA. TAX REV.
153, 207–08 (2007) (“It is likely that the same need for enforcement, legal structure, and cultural
values that currently bear on our income tax will come to bear on any new tax system we devise.
Thus, we can expect that enforcement concerns will cause the tax base definition to deviate from the
ideal to create an administrable tax; Congress will likely graft provisions to promote social policy
onto the tax system, thus complicating the code and people’s ability to comply; special interest
legislation will likely arise, further complicating the laws; and society’s underlying values, such as
horizontal equity, will likely affect the development of the law.”).
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and maximize revenue.48 The speed at which this occurs is related to the
potential revenue at stake, which in a carbon market would be significant.49
Some see inherent disadvantages in the cap-and-trade system as well. It
is undeniable that firms that carry out such trades will profit. It is also
possible, as argued by noted environmentalists such as James Hansen, that a
cap-and-trade system allows giveaways and advantages to be more easily
hidden, which in turn may increase the vested interest in such a system and
particular stakeholders providing political will for passage.50 But even those
with no vested interest in cap-and-trade have supported it as the most
efficient system for reducing greenhouse gases.51
The truth is that the best or most efficient ways to technologically
reduce greenhouse gases, or which alternative to fossil fuels will prove to be
the cheapest remains unknown, and this is a powerful argument for market
forces, rather than direct government control. As noted by Carol Rose in her
seminal article on environmental policy implementation devices, market
systems are best when the costs of the problem are large and flexibility is
needed to produce the savings to control the problem.52
Thus, market forces seem to be the best option for control, and for the
reasons discussed above,53 cap-and-trade appears to have the lead to be the
primary market solution. The bottom line is that a cap-and-trade system
seem to be the most likely avenue for regulating greenhouse gases. This will
create a new commodity and will require addressing the regulation of that
commodity market.
III. TOXIC ASSETS AND GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE
A. The Financial Crisis of 2009 and the Role of Toxic Assets
It may be impossible to pinpoint the “cause” of the Great Recession of
2008–2010, but mistaken assumptions about commodity prices are certainly

48. Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Fundamental
Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 151, 155 (1997).
49. Id.
50. James Hansen, Cap and Fade, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/
07/opinion/07hansen.html?_r=1&emc=eta1.
51. See ECON 101: Carbon Tax vs. Cap-and-Trade, ENVTL. ECON., http://www.envecon.net/carbon_tax_vs_capandtrade.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
52. See generally Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1.
53. See supra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.
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one cause.54 Particularly for that portion of the crisis where major banks
were in danger of bankruptcy and there was an extreme pullback in credit,
the devaluation of assets on the books of companies played a large role.55
The biggest culprits among these incredible shrinking assets were mortgages
and mortgage-backed securities.56
A mortgage is a commodity that represents the right to receive a
payment over a fixed time at a particular rate.57 This commodity can in turn
be bundled with other commodities to form a basket of commodities that is
itself an asset.58 Major equity and trading firms created such vehicles to
supposedly limit the risks of mortgage default, making these mortgagebacked securities an extremely popular asset class before the Great
Recession.59
Nevertheless, in hindsight the “limited risks” were likely the product of
a mistaken assumption that the asset underlying a mortgage (the real
property) would increase in value and thus be fully and overly
collateralized.60 When prices for real assets dropped, and mortgages were no
longer backed by adequate value, these assets in turn lost their value.61
Asset groups that contained these mortgages were also infected, leading
people to use the term “toxic assets” for these mortgages.62
B. Toxic Asset Risks in a Carbon Cap-and-Trade System
Fear of another asset class similarly infecting the market has led to
suspicion of cap-and-trade systems. It is estimated that a carbon cap-andtrade program will create direct assets of over one trillion dollars in its first
ten years of existence.63 If these assets in turn become parts of larger assets,
what risk will exist in the economy as a whole?

54. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
COMMISSION, at xxiii–xxiv (2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf.
55. See id.
56. See id.; Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the
“Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157, 160–61
(2009).
57. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1101–02 (9th ed. 2009).
58. See Andreas Jobst, Back to Basics: What is Securitization?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2008, at 48–
49, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/09/pdf/basics.pdf.
59. See id.; Robin S. Golden & Sameera Fazili, Raising the Roof: Addressing the Mortgage
Foreclosure Crisis Through a Collaboration Between City Government and a Law School Clinic, 2
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 29, 37–39 (2009).
60. See Jessie S. Lotay, Subprime Carbon: Fashioning an Appropriate Regulatory and
Legislative Response to the Emerging U.S. Carbon Market to Avoid a Repeat of History in Carbon
Structured Finance and Derivative Instruments, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 459, 463–69 (2010).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Monast, supra note 25, at 10053–54.
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Considering that this is an entirely new asset class, the question is an
important one. Of course we cannot know everything about the market for
something that does not yet exist, but if the fear of the assets is based on
similarities to the assets that were a part of the prior financial crisis, we can
make comparisons. This comparison indicates that for the most part, these
assets are different from the mortgage-backed assets blamed for the prior
debacle.
The primary commodity created by the market is the right to emit a
certain amount of greenhouse gases. That right will have value, and that
value will be subject to general market forces. However, there does not
appear to be a risk in misconstruing the supporting value of this asset as
there was with mortgages. The value is one created by government action
entirely. Unless the government required emitters of greenhouse gases to
surrender the rights to emit, such rights would have no scarcity and thus no
market or commodity value at all. What this means is that the “inherent”
value is thus entirely dependent on government fiat and action.64 The basis
for a long term cap-and-trade system is that the government establishes the
rules for the total amount of allocations available at the beginning of the
system.65 Both the ACES and the Kerry-Boxer bill specified exactly how
many allocations can exist in any given year, from now through perpetuity.66
This does not guarantee value of course. First, in situations of overallocation, the government may unilaterally reduce the value of emission
rights.67 However, such ratcheting is applied evenly so that it does not
Secondly,
produce disparate advantages in market participants.68
innovations may affect value. The point of restricting emissions and making
the rights to emit scarce over time is to increase the price until such point
that substitutions, such as non-greenhouse-gas emitting energy, become
more cost-efficient. When these substitutions reach a particular level of
affordability, the emission rights, their competitors in the market, will have
their value affected by this as well.69

64. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private Property
Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 295, 321–22, 321 n.99 (2003) (noting government
fiat in creating protections for land susceptible to flood produces values similar to “fiat” of backing
paper money).
65. Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade: Moving Toward
Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395, 435 (2009).
66. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 721 (2009).
67. See McAllister, supra note 65, at 414.
68. See id. at 434–35.
69. Cap and Invest: How a Cap-and-Trade Program Can Reduce Energy Costs, Create Jobs,
and Improve Energy Security, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Apr. 6, 2009),
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Moreover, comprehensive climate change legislation or even regulation
could allow other variables, such as banking, borrowing, or price collars to
exist.70 Banking allows holders of existing rights to emit to “bank” these
rights for future compliance, while borrowing allows those that need
emission rights to borrow them from future vintages, usually at a cost.71
Price collars convert the cost of emissions to a tax at a certain low or high
price.72 Both ACES73 and Kerry-Boxer allow banking, and limited
borrowing.74 Since carbon dioxide (CO2) is persistent in the atmosphere for
long periods, it is thought that borrowing and banking have no impact on
total emissions over time. Price collars and other safety valves, and their
extent, have been discussed, but no hard proposals have been put forth.75
Though in theory, price collars can actually increase the “hard cap” on
emissions, if assumptions about demand are correct, this price control
mechanism can operate predictably.
What is clear is that when the legislative rules are laid out, the market
understands this information and risk. The problem with the mortgage
backed assets is that the firms that rated them worked under an assumption
that housing values would continue to rise.76 Here, the information that can

http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/big_picture_solutions/cap-and-invest.html
(“If
companies find ways to reduce their pollution at a lower cost than the allowances, they can sell any
surplus allowances to companies that cannot. The resulting market creates an incentive to
implement cost-effective cuts in global warming emissions, and encourages investments in new lowcarbon technologies.”).
70. See generally Peter Maniloff & Brian Murray, Allowance Price Containment Options for
Cap-and-Trade Legislation (Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions ed., 2009)
(examining potential price containment options—including banking, borrowing, and price collars—
for the comprehensive climate change bills being debated by Congress in 2009).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 725 (2009); see Kristina Lewis & Terence Healy, The WaxmanMarkey Bill and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme: The Basics, MWE.COM (May 22, 2009),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2c08b2e6-aaaa-4dad-bd6c-162714765d8a
(“The
Waxman-Markey Bill proposes that entities may bank allowances and use them to comply with their
obligations in subsequent years.”); PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COST
CONTAINMENT AND OFFSET USE IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT (WAXMANMARKEY) 2 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/policymemo6-costcontainment-offsets-sept2009.pdf (“The Waxman-Markey proposal allows covered entities to bank
emission allowances indefinitely for future compliance use. In addition, the bill includes a two-year
compliance period as well as unlimited next-year borrowing of allowances with no interest.
Borrowing of up to 15 percent of an entities’ compliance obligation from a few years into the future
is also allowed, but at an effective interest rate of 8 percent.”).
74. S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 725 (2009); see PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, AT A
GLANCE: CLEAN ENERGY JOBS AND AMERICAN POWER ACT (Oct. 2009), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/chairmans-mark-kerry-boxer-10-29-09.pdf.
75. See Brian C. Murray et al., Balancing Cost and Emissions Certainty: An Allowance Reserve
for Cap-and-Trade 8–12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14258, July 15,
2008), http://www.nber.org/papers/w14258.
76. See Lotay, supra note 60, at 463–69.
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affect the price—competitor technologies, energy savings, and
government-allowed flexibility mechanisms—is understood. While we do
not know what the exact reaction of the market will be, we do know that it
will react. There is not any one factor that the market seems to have an
unfounded belief in.
The biggest unknown may be the action of the government itself. If the
government were to suddenly allow more rights to emit than anticipated at
the time of the creation of the market, that could have an important impact
on the entire asset class.77 This risk is tempered by the belief that once the
government establishes the system, it will proceed along the same path—
indeed, this has been the experience in other cap-and-trade systems.78 One
of the values of a cap-and-trade system is that everyone with an investment
in the system has an incentive to preserve the rules.79 In such cases, if there
were later rule changes, they would and should be made with the least
possible impact on the market.
To the extent that the program still has uncertainty, such as allowing
major decisions over supply and demand to be decided later, by regulation
for instance, this does indicate risk to the market. However, with the
important exception of offsets, the legislative provisions in the previously
proposed laws are quite clear and straightforward, indicating less room for
major government supply changes. California’s system is also very specific
about allocation, and to the extent the EPA introduces such a system,
regulatory controls should be as specific as possible.80
C. The “Toxicity” of Offsets?
Offsets appear to be the big piece of the system with attributes similar to
the risky assets at play in the Great Recession. “Greenhouse gas offsets” are
commonly described as projects or systems that “offset” greenhouse gas
emissions by pulling an equivalent amount of greenhouse gas (or sometimes

77. See Alexander Savelkoul & Christopher Zink, Opinion: The Price is Right, CARBON
FINANCE, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.carbon-financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=features&
action=view&id=11893 (“[T]he mere hint of government intervention in the market has the potential
to severely distort it.”).
78. See McAllister, supra note 65, at 398–410.
79. Jeanette M. Soares, Solving the Super Wicked Problem of Climate Change: How Restraining
the Present Could Aid in Establishing an Emissions Cap and Designing Allowance Auctions, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10763, 10764 (2010).
80. Id. at 10763 (noting how regulatory actions should be controlled ahead of time).
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warming potential) from the atmospheric system.81 In general, offsets must
be “permanent” and “additional” to business as usual in order to be an actual
setoff to produced greenhouse gases.82 While offsets are theoretically
neutral with respect to their impacts for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
compared with the surrender of allocations, the market effects are different.
First, unlimited offsets could imply that we may never reach a supply
constriction of emission allocations, which makes creating a market in such
allocations very difficult.83 Nevertheless, this can be managed by capping
how much compliance can be met with offsets. All of the major proposed
cap-and-trade bills of the last several years specified offset limitations,
generally at no more than 25%.84 In situations where the total amount of
offsets is capped, it can be assumed that given the differentiation in prices
for offsets and a limited market cap, one can predict that eventually the
maximum amount of offsets will be reached.85
Another potential uncertainty with offsets is exactly how they will be
defined. While the total supply of offsets was capped in the proposed
federal laws,86 the qualification procedure was less specified, with both
major bills allowing agency regulation to fully make this determination.87
The Kerry-Boxer proposal tried to lessen this impact by specifying some
likely offset categories in the legislation itself,88 thus lessening possible
volatility. While this can be problematic, in some ways it is less uncertain
than the current situation that exists in the voluntary offsets market, where
there are multiple ways to make a determination currently in use.89 By

81. Robert J. Carpenter, Implementation of Biological Sequestration Offsets in a Carbon
Reduction Policy: Answers to Key Questions for a Successful Domestic Offset Program, 31 ENERGY
L.J. 157, 165 (2010).
82. See id. at 165–66.
83. Though many experts doubt that enough offsets would be available to fail in constriction at
the beginning of the market. See Maniloff & Murray, supra note 70, at 125.
84. See LARRY PARKER & BRENT D. YACOBUCCI, GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION: CAP-ANDTRADE BILLS IN THE 100TH CONGRESS, at app. A (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/94861.pdf (comparing “key provisions” of proposed greenhouse gas
reduction bills).
85. In California, businesses have pushed for unlimited offsets recognizing the market
differential between the likely costs of offsets and cost of rights to emit. See Debra Kahn, Interest
Groups Push for Unlimited Offsets in Western Market, CLIMATEWIRE (July 29, 2008),
http://www.offsetqualityinitiative.org/pdfs/ClimateWireStory_7_08.pdf.
86. See, e.g., H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722(d)(1)(A) (2009) (capping offsets at two billion
tons); see also PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, PEW CENTER SUMMARY OF H.R. 2454:
AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009 (WAXMAN-MARKEY) 47–49 (2009),
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey%20summary_FINAL_
7.31.pdf (summarizing the relevant provisions in ACES).
87. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009).
88. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009).
89. See MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., BACK TO THE FUTURE: STATE OF VOLUNTARY
CARBON MARKETS 2001, at 55–59 annex. A.1–2 (2011), available at http://www.forest-trends.org/~
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moving offset certification and thus offset value to one certifier, this limits
some uncertainty since whatever the rules are, there will be only one set of
clear rules on offsets approvals.90
The more uncontrollable issue concerning offsets and the market is that
offsets are assets that in turn could be based on an underlying asset—the
amount of greenhouse gas permanently avoided that would not have
occurred otherwise. If the offset asset is linked to the performance of the
offset project, that can create a significant risk of market nonperformance.91
This alone does not mean that a market could not handle such information.
In general, the risk of offset underperformance, while variable, would not
necessarily suffer from market-wide misunderstanding, just as historically,
market underperformance by loans and mortgages were generally
understood by the market. It is only a problem when there is no correct
information to be relied upon. Since we do have current examples of offset
projects, and estimates about how well they sequester carbon, and
knowledge of how and whether they are “permanent,” this risk can be
controlled.92
The bigger issue is how offset project underperformance will be defined
in terms of market value by a government entity. While government
regulation can support the market by being clear in definitions, it can also
undermine the market if it is not clear about how and whether its
government-controlled approval of “valuing” of the offset can be affected
after general offset approval.
Again, since offsets have no inherent value, they are valuable to the
extent the certifying authority states that they are. If this value is determined
at one point, and in such a way that eventually the rules are understood by
the market, then this uncertainty is manageable. If the value can be revisited
with less certain principles, the market becomes more difficult. For
example, the government could specify that an offset value changes based
on the underlying success at sequestering or removing carbon, but if the

foresttr/publication_details.php?publicationID=2828 (enumerating and describing various “Market
Standards and Certification Programs” currently operating within voluntary carbon markets).
90. Maria Savasta-Kennedy, The Newest Hybrid: Notes Toward Standardized Certification of
Carbon Offsets, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 851, 857 (2009) (noting that government
regulation can “standardize” offset definitions).
91. See id. at 867 (“The lack of a consistent certification standard undermines the integrity of
offsets, both in terms of the current voluntary offset market and future regulatory markets the United
States may join.”).
92. See Cecelia Del Cid-Liccardi & Timothy Kramer, Managing Carbon Sequestration in
Tropical Forests, in FOREST AND CARBON: A SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY
FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION IN FORESTS 255, 255–79 (Mary L. Tyrrell et al. eds., 2009).
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offset did not lose its value in direct proportion to the underperformance of
the project, it would be difficult for a market to understand. Since the offset
value is in turn solely based on government fiat, this creates a difficulty that
“hard” assets do not create.
IV. OFFSETS, MARKET PERFORMANCE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE
Offset nonperformance can be understood on two distinct axes. There
could be nonperformance or underperformance on environmental goals (e.g.,
there was not an offset of greenhouse gases as predicted);93 or there could be
nonperformance or underperformance in the market context (e.g., the offset
certificate is not worth what was expected or promised because the
underlying asset’s value has eroded). Obviously, with no additional
restrictions, these would be related. For example, if an offset failed to
reduce greenhouse gases as much as projected or predicted, and its value
was based on that, then an underperformance in the environmental realm
would also mean an underperformance or performance failure in the market
context. But of course, these two factors can be separated by law. For
instance, one could have conditions precedent for qualifying an offset for the
market such that when those conditions are met, it “receives” market value
from the government program, whether or not it performs as guaranteed in
the environmental context.
The current offset market created by the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), segregates the CDM market value from
future offset reversals.94 Since these credits are then recognized in the EU
trading market,95 also without relation to any forthcoming actual
environmental performance, the market is insulated from the failure of the
underlying asset.
While this may protect the market from shocks, it opens up the
possibility that the environmental goals promised will go unrealized, and this
of course would undermine the whole purpose of the system. Offsets have
come under scathing criticism for just this problem.96 In his analysis of the

93. See Christopher S. Galik & Robert B. Jackson, Risks to Forest Carbon Offset Projects in a
Changing Climate, 257 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 2209, 2210 (2009).
94. See Offset Quality Initiative, Assessing Offset Quality in the Clean Development
Mechanism, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 25, 30–31 (2010).
95. See Judson Jaffe et al., Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging
International Climate Policy Architecture, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 789, 798–99 (2009).
96. Robert H. Frank, Carbon Offsets: A Small Price to Pay for Efficiency, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/business/31view.html.
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CDM program, Michael Wara notes that many of the CDM offsets did not
do what they promised.97
Moreover, the failure to control greenhouse gases as promised can occur
in many realms. In biological sequestration, the biological process may not
work as planned, or there could be accidental or intentional reversals,
wherein sequestered CO2 is re-released into the atmosphere.98 Moreover,
any offset may prove over time to not have been additional, or to not be
permanent.99 Proper procedures in the certifying government body can and
should be designed to minimize these possibilities, but it is true that when
the market risk is separated from the environmental risk, one removes an
important private market investigatory function, leaving environmental
vetting and verification entirely to the certifying agency. After all, if your
offset certificate retains its value even if the underlying offset reverses or
does not meet an offset criteria, this may make no difference to a market
participant.
On the other hand, if offset values can disappear based on government
reversal of value in a way that cannot be understood or predicted, this
increases the risk of the introduction of a toxic underlying asset in the
marketplace.100 Just as mortgage-backed securities lost their value and
derivatives based on them waivered, a sudden reversal of an entire offset
value could infect derivatives based on these as well.
Thus, while government protection of the greenhouse gas reduction
effects of offsets is critical, how it accomplishes this is very important for
purposes of a functioning market. An unfettered government discretionary
action might discourage anyone from purchasing or using the offsets as they
do not have any tools to assess or understand value going forward.
This seeming tradeoff, between either protecting the market from
infection or protecting the environmental reductions at all costs, leads many
to call for the elimination of offsets altogether.101 After all, if they cannot be
used as substitutes for actual source reductions, they cannot be an

97. Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2008) (“The CDM is failing as a market because its rules, rather than
producing real reductions, have accounting loopholes that allow participants to manufacture
[greenhouse gas] credits at little or no cost beyond the payment of consultants necessary to surmount
the necessary regulatory hurdles.”).
98. See Carpenter, supra note 81, at 171.
99. Id. at 166–72.
100. See STEVE SUPPAN, SPECULATING ON CARBON: THE NEXT TOXIC ASSET 6–7 (2009),
available at http://www.iatp.org/files/2009_11_30_SpeculatingOnCarbon-SS_web.pdf (arguing that
price volatility could make carbon “the next toxic asset investment”).
101. See CHAN, supra note 19, at 8.
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environmental or market problem. However, those that have studied capand-trade recognize offsets to be some of the most efficient ways to reduce
greenhouse gases.102 As noted by Brian Murray and Aaron Jenkins:
Perhaps the most compelling case for offsets use is that it can
increase the cost-effectiveness of a compliance-based cap-and-trade
system. By providing inexpensive mitigation, especially at the
beginning of a new mandatory [greenhouse gas] system, offsets
could help to lower the overall cost of reaching the abatement level
set by the policy cap.103
As such, offsets help us reach the environmental goal with less expense,
and since they can be available quickly, they provide a way for a cap-andtrade market to initially function.104 They can also function as a market
relief valve, providing ways for emitters to get permits if the price of the
right to emit goes up too quickly and unpredictably.105 Moreover, by
helping reduce other pollutants or enhancing other environmental values,
such as habitat, offsets can provide additional benefits.106
V. TAILORING LEGISLATION TO AVOID ENVIRONMENTAL
AND MARKET RISK
The risks in offsets can be divided into risks from fraud and risks from
the structure of the system itself. While fraud can be a serious issue and has
already affected the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,107 it is

102. See Brian C. Murray & W. Aaron Jenkins, Designing Cap and Trade to Account for
“Imperfect” Offsets 1 (Duke Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper EE 1003, Sept. 2010), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/environmentaleconomics/designingcap-and-trade-imperfect-offsets (“The use of offsets can potentially improve a cap-and-trade system
by lowering the overall cost of compliance, encourage mitigation from outside of the cap, and
function as a bridge strategy, giving the regulated sectors time to innovate new low-carbon
technologies and business plans.”); see also Frank, supra note 96.
103. Murray & Jenkins, supra note 102, at 3.
104. ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE & BUS. FOR SOC. RESPONSIBILITY, OFFSETTING EMISSIONS: A
BUSINESS BRIEF ON THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET 2 (2d ed. Feb. 2008), available at
http://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Voluntary-Carbon-Offsets-2.pdf.
105. See Murray & Jenkins, supra note 102, at 5–6 (describing the “welfare gains from offset
trade”).
106. Of course offsets can also cause additional social and environmental harm. Controlling for
these risks and benefits may be another aspect of offsets that can be considered by the verifying
agency. Both the Waxman-Markey and the Kerry-Boxer bills recognize these as legitimate factors
in offset approval. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009); S. 1733, 111th Cong. § 722 (2009).
And California’s AB 32 has a major focus on offset co-harms and benefits. See AB 32, supra note
10.
107. See Will Bierbower, A Brief History of Fraudulent Activity on the EU-ETS, WORLDWATCH
INST. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://blogs.worldwatch.org/revolt/a-brief-history-of-fraudulent-activity-onthe-eu-ets-2/; Nathanial Gronewold, Europe’s Carbon Emissions Trading—Growing Pains or
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little different from preventing fraud in any market system. For instance,
because the EU does not have taxes on inter-country purchasing, but does
have it within countries, fraudsters tried to defraud the Denmark tax
authorities.108 This was discovered, however, and can be addressed by
increased enforcement. Similarly, bribes can be addressed as they are
addressed in other contexts.109
Reporting schemes can also be problematic. In her Ten Ways to Game
the Carbon Market, Michelle Chan of Friends of the Earth focuses on
problems in reporting baselines—inflating how much carbon is sequestered
or reducing how much is produced—and also the potential for
misrepresenting information about whether or not an offset is real, which is
necessary to meet the requirements for an offset to be an actual “additional,
permanent” reduction from business as usual.110 In general, these concerns
are best addressed by not allowing self-reporting and having strong
monitoring and evaluation at the front end of certification of carbon credits
or offsets.111 But it is true that if this is not addressed, these are the kind of
issues that could infect the market (by value being stripped from government
action) or alternatively, not infect the market but misstate the actual
greenhouse reductions that were reported.
Thus, the trillion dollar question for a regulatory cap-and-trade system is
the one proposed in the Introduction: how does one ensure that real
reductions actually happen from offsets in a system, and also ensure that the
market does not face a substantial risk of failure that can infect other
financial instruments?
The ACES and the Kerry-Boxer bill authorize the EPA Administrator to
determine which mechanisms to employ to ensure offset integrity and also
specify two major propositions for controlling the risks associated with

Wholesale Theft?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/01/31/31
climatewire-europes-carbon-emissions-trading-growing-pai-74999.html?pagewanted=all.
108. The Carbon Carousel: VAT Tax Fraud, CORPORATE WATCH (July 22, 2010),
http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3676.
109. We do not think of bribery as a large issue in the developed world but it can have significant
consequences in the developing world. Since many offsets may be allowed from the developing
world in a U.S. system, such a problem must be considered. See Phishing, Bribery and
Falsification: Combating the Complexities of Carbon Fraud, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June 9,
2010), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2521.
110. See CHAN, supra note 19, at 2–3.
111. See Thomas P. Healy, Clearing the Air: Pursuing a Course to Define the Federal
Government’s Role in the Voluntary Carbon Offset Market, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 871, 882 (2009)
(arguing that challenges to the carbon offset market’s credibility can be improved by increased
regulation).
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offset qualification: insurance provisions and a reserve bank.112 The
provisions from ACES are reviewed in an earlier research paper from
CLEAR.113
ACES would have required the Administrator to “prescribe mechanisms
to ensure that any sequestration with respect to which an offset credit
[corresponds] . . . results in a permanent net increase in sequestration.”114
ACES “specifically lists an offset reserve mechanism (combined with
reversal penalties) and an insurance mechanism as two possibilities” to
avoid offset problems.115 “The bill’s suggested offsets reserve mechanism
establishes a pool of offset credits . . . from which credits are retired in the
event of a reversal episode at an amount sufficient ‘to fully account for the
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent’ released.”116 The goal is to ensure that
the actual greenhouse gas reduction matches the amount promised in the
initial offset.117
To build and preserve this offset reserve, offset projects must
compensate for reversal risks by paying a “reversal premium” in the form of
discounted value.118 This can be based on specific project’s known reversal
risks, but can also be more arbitrary.119 As a result, the offset approver may
issue “fewer credits to an offset project than it has actually sequestered” in
many cases.120
Additionally, ACES requires offset project developers “to pay a reversal
penalty to help replenish the offset reserve” when a reversal occurs.121 If the
reversal is intentional, the “offset project developer must place credits or
allowances into the reserve ‘equal in number to the number of reserve offset
credits that were canceled due to the reversal.’”122 If the reversal is
unintentional, the project developer must place the lesser of “half the
number of credits canceled due to the reversal or half the number of credits
already placed into the reserve for that project, whichever is less.”123

112. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734 (2009).
113. See Ken Allinson et al., International Avoided Deforestation Offset Projects: Insuring the
Risk of Reversal Penalties (Ctr. for Law, Env’t, Adaptation & Res., May 2010), available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clear/adoffsetreversalpenaltyinsurance.pdf.
114. Id. at 8 (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009)).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B)(i) (2009)).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(A) (2009)).
121. See id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B) (2009)).
122. Id. at 8–9 (quoting H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2009)).
123. Id. at 9. Here is an example to illustrate this provision:
[C]onsider a hypothetical project that offsets one-hundred tons of carbon dioxide
(“CO2”) in one vintage year. Under ACES, if the Administrator applied a twenty percent
discount, it would issue the project developer eighty offset credits and place twenty
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The reversal penalty is the “key to maintaining environmental integrity”
in the ACES offset program.124 Without replenishment, the reserve pool
would be depleted, and the Administrator “would not be able to retire offset
credits equal to the amount of CO2 released in a reversal.”125 “Such a
scenario would create a gap between AD offset credits on the market and the
putative corresponding amount of tons sequestered.”126 The offset reserve
mechanism ensures that the amount of offset credits introduced into the
market never exceeds the amount of CO2 the offset project is actually
supposed to sequester and thus protects environmental integrity.127
ACES alternatively suggests an insurance mechanism to ensure
environmental integrity. This would provide “for purchase and provision to
the Administrator for retirement of an amount of offset credits or emission
allowances equal . . . to the tons of carbon dioxide equivalents of greenhouse
gas emissions released due to reversal.”128 ACES would leave the form of
insurance to the Administrator’s discretion129 but there are prior examples of
situations in which insurance requirements have been used to ensure
environmental integrity.130 Both the Resource Conservation and Recovery

credits into the offset reserve at the end of the vintage year. Now assume that this project
experiences an unintentional reversal (e.g., a forest fire initiated by lightening) releasing
forty tons of sequestered CO2. Under ACES, at the time of reversal, the Administrator
would retire a quantity of offset credits equivalent to forty tons of CO2 from the offset
reserve to account for the credits lost due to the unintentional reversal. The
Administrator would then require the project developer to place ten offset credits into the
reserve (half the number already reserved for that project), rather than twenty credits (half
the number of credits retired by the Administrator).
Id. at 9 n.31.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009)) (charging the Administrator to
“prescribe mechanisms to ensure that any sequestration with respect to which an offset credit is
issued . . . results in a permanent net increase in sequestration, and that full account is taken of any
actual or potential reversal of such sequestration”).
128. Id. (citing H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2)(B) (2009)).
129. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009) (instructing the Administrator to create “at
least one” mechanism designed to ensure that all sequestration for which offset credit is issued
actually “result[s] in a permanent net increase in sequestration”—including an offsets reserve or an
insurance provision).
130. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); see also
EPA Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 264.147 (2011) (implementing the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act by requiring “[a]n owner or operator of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facility
[to] . . . demonstrate financial responsibility for bodily injury and property damage to third parties
caused by sudden accidental occurrences arising from operations of the facility”); Jeffrey Kehne,
Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous
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Act and the Underground Storage Tank provisions of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act require that those handling potentially environmentally
harmful products maintain insurance or bonding sufficient to ensure that any
damage from an accident could be corrected.131 Such provisions could be
applied in an offset context as well, since sequestration would be a product
on the market that could be purchased to provide for offsetting unexpected
greenhouse gas release harms.
Since these proposals for reversal require that reversal risks are borne by
the offset project developer, these proposals would generally not cause any
reduction in the value of the offset once it has been certified. In this sense, it
would be similar to the CDM mechanism wherein offsets retain market
value once they have been approved. This avoids situations in which the
manner of government accountability for reversals is unknown and thus
would eliminate unexpected “toxicity” in offset asset classes. Moreover,
unlike the situation with the CDM, both of these mechanisms provide
legitimate ways for the greenhouse-gas-reducing integrity to be preserved.
The reserve requirement in particular is well drafted. Risks of loss are
factored in at the beginning based on actuarial data, and intentional reversals
provide for additional penalties, all of which shore up the reserve necessary
to preserve the greenhouse gas reductions.132 The insurance provision is less
certain to address actual losses since it is unknown how such insurance
would be capitalized or operationalized, but as noted above, such programs
can work.133
Unfortunately, the bills do not stop there in accounting for offset
reversals. In the ACES and Kerry-Boxer proposals, there is one key
sentence that allows the Administrator of the offset system to make “any
other provisions the Administrator determines necessary” to ensure the
environmental benefits of carbon reduction if there is a problem with
offsets.134 While one sentence may seem innocuous in a bill that runs to
hundreds of pages, this language is particularly problematic for the risk of
introducing toxic assets in a cap-and-trade system. It is uncertain what this
provision would have looked like in practice, but it seems to have been
designed to allow the offset administering agency to do anything necessary
to preserve the environmental value of an offset. While laudable from an
environmental perspective, this could introduce massive uncertainty into a

Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 416–17 (1986) (noting that RCRA regulations require hazardous waste
facilities to carry liability coverage).
131. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b, 6991b(d)(1) (2006).
132. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 734(b)(3), 734(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2009).
133. Of course there is a possibility that insurance markets themselves can fail as was seen in the
recent financial crisis, and the risks of systemic failure of the whole system would need to be
examined before deciding solely on an insurance provision for safeguard.
134. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734 (2009).
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market. Any offset, in anyone’s hands, could have its value reduced to zero
at any time, and in unpredictable ways. Assets based on such offsets, such
as derivatives, would in turn see their values reduced in completely
unknowable amounts.
In one sense, such a provision recalls the government’s unfettered power
under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) clean-ups, when the government and other parties
could go after anyone seeking up to full liability.135 The response in that
situation was avoidance of the system entirely, which could be expected here
as well, removing any benefits of offsets from a cap-and-trade market.136
What then is the lesson from regulation of offsets in a cap-and-trade
market? In order to preserve both environmental and market integrity, the
needle must be threaded carefully. Some provision must be made to ensure
that underperforming offsets are made whole or accounted for so that all
expected greenhouse gas reduction occurs.137 But this provision should be
structured in a way to throw the risk of loss on a predictable target rather
than on the offset asset itself. The most likely provision would put the risk
of loss on the offset developer, who is the one who creates and profits from
the offset originally.
Such a risk of loss aligns incentives to prod the developers to be careful
and honest in offset development. Of course, there must be some way to
ensure that offset developers can make sub-performing offsets whole. Both
a carefully structured insurance mechanism and an even more creative
reserve mechanism would do this.138 If the reversal percentages are
calculated correctly, the offset reserve should be entirely sufficient to handle
offset failures.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there could be problems with a cap-and-trade system to control
greenhouse gases, the risk of financial ruin from toxic assets need not be one
of them. Assuming we are in an inexorable march towards cap-and-trade
with linked systems both domestically and internationally, it is important to

135. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607 (2006).
136. See Alfred R. Light, Restatement for Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After
Burlington Northern, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11058, 11058 (2009) (noting that, under
Burlington, a party can avoid CERCLA liability by demonstrating that a “reasonable basis . . . exists
to limit the extent of his liability”).
137. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009).
138. See H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 734(b)(2) (2009).
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understand this simple fact.139 It is not that a huge new market with exotic
financial instruments could not pose risk, it is that we can understand where
such a risk comes from, and have effective ways of countering such risk.140
In the carbon market scenario, this requires a focus on offsets. Offset
programs can be designed to ensure that they do the environmental job of
actually reducing or sequestering greenhouse gases while also ensuring that
reversals and underperformance do not create toxic assets. Because the
government controls the value, it can define how an offset will be valued
and then ensure that the value will be retained in a market. It then ensures
environmental integrity by creating mechanisms which ensure that all losses
can be covered by a particular participant, in this case the offset developer.
Given the criticism that the ACES proposal’s great complexity was its
problem,141 it is ironic that the examples of the more complex provisions in
these bills, such as reserve mechanisms, are more likely to ensure both
environmental and market stability than the simple general regulatory
authority provisions. The specific provisions in the bills can work and
unfettered government discretion could create market dangers.142 Wherever
cap-and-trade systems are adopted, be they statutory or regulatory, if we can
tailor the offset provisions in a manner to account for losses in a particular
way as outlined in the statutory proposals, we can have our environmental
cake and the market too.

139. See supra Part II.
140. See supra Part V.
141. Senate Offers Some Hope for Legislation to Combat Climate Change, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020903526.html.
142. See supra Part V.
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